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ESSAY 
RETURN OF THE JRAD 
JASON A. CADE* 
INTRODUCTION 
When Ignacio Diaz Aguilar pleaded guilty to document forgery, he 
became a priority for deportation.1 The conviction also means that an 
immigration judge cannot consider whether the hardship to Mr. Aguilar’s 
family or other equitable considerations warrant setting aside his removal.2 
Already detained under an immigration hold, it became all but guaranteed 
that Ignacio Aguilar soon will be banished from the United States. 
And yet, when Federal District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein 
sentenced Mr. Aguilar on August 14, 2015, he did something unusual.3 
Judge Weinstein’s sentencing order described at length Mr. Aguilar’s 
“otherwise legal way of life” and his productive contributions to this 
country for more than a decade, despite facing a childhood full of hardship, 
including physical abuse.4 The sentencing order also contained detailed 
findings about the health and economic impacts that Mr. Aguilar’s 
deportation would have on his young United States citizen children. Judge 
Weinstein concluded his opinion in an unorthodox way: He recommended 
* Assistant Professor, University of Georgia Law School. My gratitude to Dan Coenen, Kevin
Lapp, Usha Rodrigues, Jenny Roberts, Muneer Ahmad, Mark Weidemaier, Sharon Rush, Richard 
Boswell, and participants at the Southeast Junior-Senior Faculty Workshop and the Clinical Law 
Review Writers Workshop for very helpful comments and suggestions. “Joey” Wai Shan Fong, 
UGA Law ’17 provided terrific research assistance. I also appreciate the editorial assistance of the 
NYU Law Review staff. Thanks to Dean Peter Rutledge and the University of Georgia for 
research support. 
 1  See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, U.S. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., for Thomas S. 
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3 (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_ 
prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (establishing that noncitizens convicted of any felony fall within the 
agency’s “highest priority” for removal).  
 2  Although Mr. Aguilar is an undocumented noncitizen, and deportable on that basis alone, 
his long-term residence in the United States, family ties, and other positive factors suggest that he 
would be eligible to seek discretionary cancellation of removal but for the nature of his criminal 
conviction. See infra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
 3  United States v. Aguilar, Statement of Reasons for Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(c)(2), 14-CR-0668 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015). 
 4  Id. at 2; see also id. 20–21 (describing Mr. Aguilar’s individual circumstances in more 
detail). 
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that the government not deport Mr. Aguilar, even though no legal rules 
provided him with a route to that result.5 
This essay places Judge Weinstein’s recommendation in a broader 
context and explains its importance within the modern deportation regime. 
Statutory reforms and new agency practices have made criminal history the 
primary marker of noncitizen undesirability.6 This criminal history proxy 
has become so prominent that even longtime lawful permanent residents 
(LPRs) with only minor convictions and significant contributions or family 
ties often cannot escape removal. Convictions and even mere arrests are 
also used to determine enforcement targets among the more than eleven 
million undocumented noncitizens in the United States, who under earlier 
law could appeal to an immigration judge’s discretion to set aside 
deportation based on factors such as the nature and severity of the offense, 
the length of the noncitizen’s residence, the hardship that deportation 
would visit on the noncitizen’s family members, and evidence of 
rehabilitation.7 As a result, the immigration system, as it operates today, is 
in deep tension with the principle that under a humane system of justice the 
penalty should fit the crime.8 
Judge Weinstein’s unusual sentencing order in Aguilar both highlights 
the severity of modern deportation law and points the way to an important 
administrative reform that would decrease the likelihood of unjustified 
 
 5  See id. at 2 (“The facts of this case lead to a recommendation of this court that the general 
practice of deportation not be followed.”). 
 6  See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 665–68 
(2015) (examining the causes and consequences of the immigration enforcement regime’s 
embrace of noncitizen’s criminal history as a “near-irrevocable proxy” for undesirability); Allegra 
M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 105, 125–30 (2012) (analyzing and critiquing various justifications underlying the 
U.S. criminal-immigration enforcement model).  
 7  See former Immigration and Nationality Act § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed Sept. 
30, 1996) (providing for suspension of deportation for non-LPRs based on a balancing of positive 
and negative equities). 
 8  See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional 
Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243, 1246 (2013) (“Deportation should only be utilized when it is a 
proportionate response to criminal activity.”); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION 
LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 146, 156–57, 211, 219 (2012) (evaluating deportation 
sanctions in light of international human rights principles of proportionality); Steven H. 
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice 
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 520 (2007) (observing the social costs of “crime-related 
deportations [that] are grossly out of proportion to the underlying misconduct”); Juliet Stumpf, 
Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1730 (2009) (“The criminalization of 
immigration law has highlighted the striking disparity between the proportionality norms that 
animate criminal punishment and the lack of such proportionality in immigration law.”); Michael 
J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 415, 
416–17 (2012) (defining proportionality as “the notion that the severity of a sanction should not 
be excessive in relation to the gravity of an offense,” and arguing that removal orders should be 
subject to “constitutional proportionality review”).  
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removals in cases that involve noncitizens with a criminal history. In the 
not-too-distant past, Judge Weinstein’s recommendation against 
deportation would have been unremarkable, if not routine. When Congress 
enacted the first criminal removal statute in 1917, it provided for the 
deportation of noncitizens convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” 
(CIMT), if the conviction occurred within five years of the noncitizen’s 
entry to the United States.9 But Congress also provided a mechanism for 
sentencing judges to issue a Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation 
(JRAD).10 Throughout the twentieth century, JRADs were considered 
binding on federal executive officials.11 Thus, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court, JRADs gave sentencing judges a powerful tool to 
avert unjust deportations, based on their knowledge of the nature of the 
crime and the defendant’s individualized circumstances.12 In 1990, 
 
 9  See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 889, codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 155(a) (“[A]ny alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year 
or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed 
within five years after the entry . . . shall, upon the warrant . . . , be taken into custody and 
deported.”). 
 10  Id. (“[T]he provision . . . respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude shall not apply . . . if the court, . . . make[s] a recommendation . . . that 
such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act . . . .”); see also 53 CONG. REC. 5171 
(1916) (statement of Rep. Powers) (“[A]t the time the judgment is rendered and at the time the 
sentence is passed, the [criminal sentencing] judge is best qualified to make these 
recommendations.”); 53 CONG. REC. 5169 (statement of Rep. Sabath) (“[N]o judge would 
deliberately order that deportation be not made unless there was good reason for it.”). 
 11  The JRAD barred both deportation and exclusion on the basis of the underlying 
conviction. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Santarelli v. Hughes, 116 F.2d 613, 617 (3d Cir. 1940) 
(deportation); United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1994) (exclusion). But courts 
were split whether a JRAD would prohibit a discretionary denial of relief from removal. Compare 
Giambanco v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 531 F.2d 141, 146–47, 149 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(holding that JRAD bars the use of conviction in an application for adjustment of status or other 
discretionary relief), and Matter of Gonzalez, 16 I. & N. Dec. 134, 136–37 (B.I.A. 1977) (holding 
JRAD removes statutory bar to administrative determination of good moral character in a 
voluntary departure hearing), with Hassan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 66 F.3d 266, 
269 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that JRAD does not preclude consideration of conviction in a 
request for discretionary relief), and Delgado-Chavez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 765 
F.2d 868, 870 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that conviction may be considered in a voluntary departure 
hearing, notwithstanding JRAD). 
 12  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362–64 (2010) (discussing how the loss of the JRAD 
and other statutory changes in immigration law “dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s 
criminal conviction” and, correspondingly, the “importance of accurate legal advice for 
noncitizens accused of crimes”). In practice, however, JRADs were not widely requested, in part 
due to the relative infrequency of conviction-based removals until the late twentieth century. See 
Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration Judge, 51 EMORY 
L.J. 1131, 1148–50 (2002) (discussing the reasons behind low visibility of JRADs); Philip L. 
Torrey, The Erosion of Judicial Discretion in Crime-Based Removal Proceedings, 14–02 
IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 5 (Feb. 2014) (outlining three primary reasons why JRADs were rarely 
used in practice, namely: (1) low rate of crime-based deportations prior to 1990s, (2) the 
nonexistence of comprehensive system to identify noncitizens with criminal convictions, and (3) 
sentencing judges’ reluctance to interpret immigration law by issuing JRADs).  
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however, Congress repealed this judicial authority.13 
Despite the elimination of the statutory JRAD, a sentencing judge’s 
decision to recommend against deportation in criminal cases has the 
potential to offer immigration enforcement authorities an efficient, reliable, 
and cost-effective means of assessing a noncitizen’s positive and negative 
equities and determining whether removal is an appropriate part of the total 
penalty for the noncitizen’s transgression. This judicial pronouncement—
which might be called a “Nonstatutory Judicial Recommendation Against 
Deportation” (NJRAD)—could serve as a disproportionality rule of thumb, 
tempering and refining the role that criminal history plays in immigration 
authorities’ decisions about who to place into deportation proceedings. 
Other disproportionality rules of thumb are available as well. Pardons, 
expungements, deferred adjudications, and similar forms of relief from all-
out criminal punishments typically require a balancing of the egregiousness 
of the underlying offense and the case-specific mitigating factors. 
This essay argues that immigration enforcement officials could adopt 
a policy of presuming that the award of such relief within the criminal 
justice system itself signals that a noncitizen’s encounter with the criminal 
system alone should not lead to deportation. To be sure, in some cases, that 
presumption can and should be overcome, particularly when the 
government can establish the noncitizen’s dangerousness or otherwise 
demonstrate social undesirability. But deportation should be the exception, 
not the rule (much less, the all-but-inexorable rule) in cases where the end 
result of the criminal process involves elimination or mitigation of the 
underlying criminal conviction. So long as Congress fails to restore 
adjudicative discretion to immigration judges or to rollback over-inclusive 
deportation grounds through legislative means, the system must rely on 
second-best solutions to achieve proportionality. 
In the remainder of this essay, I develop these ideas. Part I explains 
the context of Judge Weinstein’s recommendation against deportation in 
the modern deportation system. Part II lays out the benefits of recognizing 
new disproportionality rules of thumb. Finally, Part III considers potential 
objections to the policy I propose here. 
I 
THE RISE OF THE CRIMINAL HISTORY PROXY AND THE DECLINE OF FORMAL 
EQUITY IN IMMIGRATION LAW 
The late twentieth century ushered in an era of far-reaching 
 
 13  See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (Nov. 
29, 1990) (“Elimination of Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation”); see also infra note 
17 and accompanying text (finding little evidence of congressional reflection on the repeal of 
JRADs in the legislative history). 
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immigration reform, much of it aimed at noncitizens with criminal 
histories. During this period, Congress dramatically expanded the grounds 
that supported deportation based on immigration violations and criminal 
convictions.14 It also took a meat cleaver to the longstanding statutory 
mechanisms that offered opportunities for obtaining relief from removal.15 
The authority of immigration judges to set aside removals based on the 
equities of particular cases was drastically curtailed. In similar fashion, 
Congress stripped away the power sentencing judges held to issue JRADs. 
Congress first cut back on judicial authority in this area when it enacted 
legislation that made JRADs inapplicable in cases involving noncitizens 
convicted of narcotics offenses.16 But it was removed entirely in 1990.17 
Other legislation adopted during this same time frame also narrowed the 
ameliorative effect of pardons, expungements, and deferred adjudications 
for purposes of immigration law.18 
The upshot of these statutory changes was that noncitizens in the 
United States, including longtime LPRs, became broadly deportable for the 
 
 14  For a discussion of modern immigration law’s increased focus on enforcement, 
criminalization, and deportation, see Cade, supra note 6, at 671–75 (discussing the history of 
Congress’s expansion of immigration penalties and noncitizen deportations based on criminal 
convictions); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the 
Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1937–42 (2000) (explaining how 
Congress’s 1996 immigration laws affected LRPs by increasing the likelihood of mandatory 
deportation for any criminal conviction); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, 
Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 378–86 (2006) (discussing historical 
convergence of immigration and criminal law due to policymakers’ efforts to increase 
deportations of noncitizens with criminal convictions, criminalization of immigration violations, 
and national anti-terrorism movement’s purported link to immigration). 
 15  See Cade, supra note 6, at 671–79 (detailing the government’s exclusion of noncitizens 
with criminal convictions from discretionary equitable relief from removal); Peter H. Schuck & 
John Williams, Removing Criminal Aliens: The Promises and Pitfalls of Federalism, 22 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 437–38 (1999) (providing historical and political account of immigration 
policy developments aimed to effectuate deportations including proposals to streamline removal 
procedures, increase immigration agents’ authority to arrest noncitizens, and reduce noncitizen 
due process rights and opportunities for relief). 
 16  See Torrey, supra note 12, at 5 (explaining how post-World War II concern over the rise in 
drug addictions in the United States resulted in Congress’s focus on noncitizens with drug-related 
convictions as primary targets for deportation and exemption from the JRAD relief). In 1988, 
however, the JRAD statutory authority was expanded briefly to guard against unfair applications 
of a newly created aggravated felony deportation category. Id. 
 17  Id. at 5, 12 (noting the statutory provision repealing JRAD); see also supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. Very little legislative history sheds any additional light on Congress’s 
decision to repeal the JRAD. See Taylor & Wright, supra note 12, at 1151 n.75 (“A search of the 
Congressional Record does not reveal any debate on the floor over JRAD repeal.”); Torrey, supra 
note 12, at 5 (same). 
 18  Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 355, 368 (2012) 
(explaining the circumstances in which such processes will not preclude removal based on the 
underlying criminal history); Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and 
the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665, 701, 707–08 (2008) (same); see also 
infra Part II.B. 
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commission of criminal offenses. Indeed, the amendments were so 
expansive that deportation has become the norm based on misdemeanors 
and even criminal events that the state itself did not consider to give rise to 
an initial or continuing conviction.19 Too few opportunities remain for such 
noncitizens to argue to an adjudicator that equitable considerations 
(including longtime connections to the United States) outweigh the gravity 
of their infractions. In short, under current law many noncitizens are 
detained, deported, and often permanently banished, without any 
adjudicative consideration being given to whether such extreme sanctions 
fit the underlying crime or comport with justice in light of the 
countervailing equities of the particular case. 
Congress’s decision to remove equitable discretion from adjudicative 
decisionmaking, however, does not eliminate it from the system altogether. 
Enforcement actors at both state and federal levels wield considerable 
equitable power as they set priorities and undertake individual enforcement 
actions.20 Indeed, as the literature in criminal law suggests, prosecutorial 
discretionary power tends to rise as statutory codes become more severe 
and the space for judicial discretion narrows.21 It follows that in our 
modern deportation scheme, considerations of fairness and proportionality 
can still play a role, but primarily through the exercise of enforcement 
discretion. Such discretion functions as a “flexible shock absorber,” 
allowing for consideration of a noncitizen’s individual equities in a system 
otherwise marked by the highest level of rigidity.22 
 
 19  See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 437 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2014) (holding that petitioner was 
not entitled to post-conviction relief when his guilty plea was expunged after successful 
completion of judicial diversion, notwithstanding attorney’s failure to advise him of the 
immigration consequences of the guilty plea). See generally Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain 
Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1751, 1803-04 (2013) 
(examining the prevalence of guilty pleas in misdemeanor courts and the immigration 
consequences of misdemeanors for noncitizens).  
 20  See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 
125 YALE L.J. 104, 130–35 (2015) (examining the executive branch’s extensive power over 
immigration enforcement); KANSTROOM, supra note 8, at 215–16 (considering various forms of 
discretion available in the immigration system, including prosecutorial, interpretive, and 
delegated discretion); Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 554–
58 (2013) (analyzing the state criminal courts’ power in determining immigration outcomes); 
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WAHDIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION 4, 10–12, 146–47 (2015) (analyzing 
prosecutorial discretion at various levels of the immigration enforcement system). 
 21  See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1664–72 (2010) (explaining how overly expansive 
criminal codes increase the space for prosecutorial discretion); Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1428–34 
(2008) (explaining how mandatory federal sentencing guidelines transfer discretion over the 
severity of punishment from judges to prosecutors); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics 
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519–23 (2001) (explaining how broad penal codes 
transfer “lawmaking” power from courts to enforcers). 
 22  KANSTROOM, supra note 8, at 215. 
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The Obama administration has taken steps to inject equity into 
immigration enforcement.23 First, the current administration has generally 
focused its enforcement efforts on recent entrants to the United States and 
noncitizens who engage in crimes.24 While the administration’s overly 
coarse approach within these targeted groups is problematic, as will be 
explained shortly, focused enforcement choices decrease the probability of 
enforcement against individuals in non-targeted groups, whom the 
administration may believe are more likely to present significant equitable 
claims. Second, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leaders have 
encouraged front-line government agents and attorneys in its enforcement 
sub-agencies to increase their use of prosecutorial discretion, including 
deferring removals in light of humanitarian or fairness concerns.25 Third, 
the administration has developed categorical policy initiatives, such as 
Deferred Adjudication for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(DAPA), which allow some deportable noncitizens to gain a reprieve from 
removal based on particularly sympathetic equitable considerations (such 
as the well-being and diminished culpability of children).26 
Despite these efforts, reliance on enforcement officials to inject 
necessary equity into the removal system has thus far fallen short. The 
agency’s prosecutorial tunnel vision and crushing workloads have 
significantly hampered top-down efforts to elevate the use of prosecutorial 
discretion by front-line operatives.27 As a result, inconsistency dominates, 
both within and across jurisdictions.28 While the institutional design of 
DACA and DAPA offers gains in transparency and regularity over 
individual prosecutorial discretion, such programs do not reach the 
majority of deportable noncitizens and have been stymied by controversy 
and litigation.29 
Most critically, the executive branch has largely failed to consider 
individual equities of any kind when it comes to noncitizens with a 
criminal history. Criminality, broadly conceptualized to include low-level 
offenses, has become an almost irrefutable signifier of undesirability in the 
 
 23  For a more in-depth analysis of the present administration’s actions with respect to 
immigration policy and enforcement, see Cade, supra note 6. 
 24  Id. at 687–91. 
 25  Id. at 691–94. 
 26  Id. at 694–98. 
 27  Jason A. Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 
TULANE L. REV. 1, 46–54 (2014).  
 28  Id. at 31–34. 
 29  Cade, supra note 6, at 700, 709–11; Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised 
Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58, 64–66 (2015). 
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modern deportation system.30 The administration’s prosecutorial discretion 
guidelines exclude persons with virtually any level of conviction. The 
agency aggressively pursues noncitizens with convictions—even longtime 
permanent residents convicted only of misdemeanors—consistently 
arguing for the broadest and most severe interpretations of the statutes 
governing removal on criminal grounds.31 Even suspected criminal status 
operates as a sorting mechanism, as arrests are used to help identify which 
of the eleven million undocumented persons should be targeted, even when 
the noncitizen is never convicted or even prosecuted.32 
Criminal history provides an attractive proxy for Congress and the 
executive for a number of reasons. In general, focusing on persons with 
convictions is politically advantageous.33 Lawmakers and enforcement 
officials are seen as acting legitimately when they target persons who have 
committed (or who might commit) crimes or similar offenses.34 And, to be 
sure, criminal history provides post-entry screening information about 
factors relevant to the nation’s membership choices, such as respect for 
law, dangerousness, social adaptability, and economic productivity.35 For 
this reason, prioritizing noncitizens who have had run-ins with law 
enforcement is seen as an efficient means of narrowing a very large pool of 
potential enforcement targets.36 
The administration’s blanket approach is problematic, however, 
because not all persons with convictions, let alone arrests, are similarly 
situated. Many noncitizens with serious criminal histories should be 
deported. But for others, such a severe penalty will be disproportionate in 
light of relatively minor criminal conduct and a range of mitigating factors, 
such as long-term residence in the United States, the passage of time since 
 
 30  Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 827–29 (2015); McLeod, supra 
note 6, at 130–31. 
 31  See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. __, at 21, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013) (“This is 
the third time in seven years that we have considered whether the Government has properly 
characterized a low-level drug offense as ‘illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,’ and thus an 
‘aggravated felony.’ Once again we hold that the Government’s approach defies ‘the 
commonsense’ . . . .” (internal citations omitted)); Cade, supra note 6, at 700; KANSTROOM, 
supra note 8, at 98. 
 32  Cade, supra note 6, at 704–05; Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An 
Analysis of Variation in Local Law Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1139 (2013); Jain, 
supra note 30, at 829. 
 33  JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 76–77 (2007); 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1460–
61 (2013); Stuntz, supra note 21, at 570–71. 
 34  SIMON, supra note 33, 109–10. 
 35  Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 809, 826–27 (2007); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and 
Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 510–14 (2009). 
 36  Cox & Posner, supra note 35, at 826–27; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 520–21. 
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the offense, separation from family members, rehabilitation, or poor health. 
If the key goal is removing noncitizens who pose a true danger to society, it 
does not follow that every noncitizen with a conviction is justifiably 
deported and subject to the bars on future lawful return. The 
administration’s wooden reliance on criminal history as an uncontestable 
trigger for deportation, without consideration of individualized 
circumstances, thus creates the likelihood of far-reaching injustice. And it 
does so precisely because little opportunity for adjudicative relief from 
removal is available once criminality is established. 
Until Congress restores adjudicative discretion in immigration courts, 
it remains the responsibility of the executive branch enforcement officials 
to ensure proportionality in the implementation of deportation rules.37 
There are, however, grave practical problems with seeing to it that this 
responsibility is properly discharged. DHS has had difficulty supervising 
thousands of dispersed, numbers-driven front-line officials, most of whom 
contend with very heavy workloads—challenges that thus far overwhelm 
efforts to inject individualized assessments into enforcement decisions.38 In 
light of these salient features of the deportation system, how can the agency 
better ensure that the criminal history proxy does not result in immigration 
consequences that are unjustly disproportionate? One starting point 
involves the identification of easily administered disproportionality rules of 
thumb. 
II 
DISPROPORTIONALITY RULES OF THUMB 
The discussion now turns to the reasons why policy leaders in the 
executive branch should consider adopting a practice of generally deferring 
to judicial recommendations against deportation, along with certain other 
criminal law events, as tools for achieving equity in individual cases 
involving persons with criminal histories. Reliance on disproportionality 
rules of thumb would give rise to a cost-effective and efficient 
administrative reform that could be implemented without delay. Doing so 
would better align federal immigration and state (or federal) criminal 
 
 37  Cade, supra note 6 at 668–69; KANSTROOM, supra note 8 at 214; WAHDIA, supra note 20, 
at 147–48; see also Jason A. Cade, Policing the Immigration Police: ICE Prosecutorial 
Discretion and the Fourth Amendment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 180, 203 (2013) (arguing 
that the executive branch bears responsibility for ensuring that constitutional rules are fully 
upheld in its implementation of immigration law). 
 38  Cade, supra note 27; Erin B. Corcoran, Seek Justice, Not Just Deportation: How to 
Improve Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 144–45 
(2014); Kalhan, supra note 29, at 88–89; Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals? Discretion, Sorting, 
and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 195, 
213–25, 233–35 (2014). 
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justice interests and would help avoid at least some removals that would be 
out of proportion with the gravity of the underlying offense and the 
noncitizen’s mitigating factors. 
A. Nonstatutory JRADs 
Judge Weinstein’s order in United States v. Aguilar points the way 
toward an important, if distinctly second-best, reform in the immigration 
system. Despite the statutory JRAD’s repeal, nothing prevents the agency 
from deferring on a discretionary basis to Judge Weinstein’s 
recommendation that Mr. Aguilar not be deported, as it determines its own 
enforcement priorities. A criminal sentencing order is typically the product 
of a nuanced and holistic evaluation of the underlying criminal activity and 
any mitigating circumstances presented by the case. It thus offers the 
potential to serve as a valuable surrogate for the kind of balancing that 
previously would have taken place in immigration court, before Congress 
curtailed adjudicative discretionary authority. Indeed, the former statutory 
JRAD process was grounded in the understanding—no less accurate today 
than it was back then—that criminal court judges have access to distinctly 
valuable information about the facts of the crime and the defendant’s 
circumstances.39 
In Aguilar, for example, Judge Weinstein discussed in detail the 
nature of the noncitizen’s criminal offense, his lack of any prior criminal 
history, and his difficult life circumstances, as well as the hardship his 
removal would visit upon his family, particularly his children. Judge 
Weinstein acknowledged the seriousness of the underlying criminal 
activity—helping a government confidential informant obtain fraudulent 
documents including a passport, social security card, and permanent 
resident card—although he also observed that the activity was “arguably 
induced by the informant.”40 The report indicated that the defendant made a 
full confession, pleading guilty to passport forgery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1543, and noted that there was no suggestion of additional criminal 
activity by the defendant.41 
Judge Weinstein further found that Mr. Aguilar was raised in poverty 
 
 39  See, e.g., Yolanda Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 
the Court, and the Sixth Amendment, 20 LA RAZA L.J. 31, 39–40 (2010) (arguing that criminal 
court judges were well suited to consider immigration consequences of defendant’s conviction 
when the JRAD was in effect). 
 40  United States v. Aguilar, Statement of Reasons for Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(c)(2), No. 14-CR-0668, at 4 (Aug. 14, 2015, E.D.N.Y.). 
 41  Id. at 2, 5; see also id. at 2 (“The crime charged appears to be a deviation from an 
otherwise legal way of life.”). 
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and that both his parents died when he was very young.42 He was 
repeatedly beaten by uncles and taken out of school in the seventh grade. 
Migrating to the United States, he started a family in his early twenties and 
found work in the construction industry for well over a decade. His 
employers informed the court that Mr. Aguilar has been a diligent and 
responsible worker throughout that time.43 
During the sentencing hearing, the court took testimony from the 
defendant’s spouse and two adolescent children, both United States 
citizens.44 Judge Weinstein’s report noted that the children were crying, 
dejected, and visibly depressed, and that both had been struggling 
academically and socially since their father’s incarceration.45 To support 
his conclusion that Aguilar’s removal would cause significant hardship to 
his children, Judge Weinstein devoted seven pages of his report to 
compiling and explaining the relevance of studies finding correlations 
between the deportation of one or both parents and harmful impacts on 
their children, including anxiety, depression, behavioral problems, and 
academic failure in the immediate term, and increased likelihood of poverty 
and criminality as adults.46 
The judge sentenced Mr. Aguilar to seven months incarceration (time-
served), three years supervised release, and a $100 special assessment fee.47 
He also recommended to the immigration judge that Aguilar not be 
deported.48 Technically, Judge Weinstein addressed his recommendation to 
the wrong immigration official. If Mr. Aguilar is found deportable, no 
immigration judge is likely to have authority to set aside removal as a 
discretionary matter. The forgery conviction would be classified as a 
CIMT, thus requiring his deportation.49 Although he is also deportable on 
unlawful presence grounds,50 Mr. Aguilar might have been able to secure 
discretionary relief based on his length of residence, hardship to his 
children, and other governing requirements.51 However, as the statute has 
 
 42  Id. at 20. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. at 5–6. 
 45  Id. at 6, 21. 
 46  Id. at 11–17. 
 47  Id. at 21. 
 48  Id.  
 49  See Cetik v. Gonzales, 181 Fed. Appx. 117, 119 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing cases establishing 
that fraud and forgery are CIMTs). 
 50  See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) 
(providing that persons residing in the United States without having been admitted by 
immigration officials are inadmissible (and therefore removable)). 
 51  See Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (2012) (non-LPRs are 
eligible to apply for cancellation of removal if they can show ten years of continuous physical 
presence in the United States immediately preceding the application, ten years of “good moral 
character” at the time of adjudication, and that removal would result in “exceptional and 
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been interpreted, his felony CIMT conviction negates his entitlement to 
petition for this remedy.52 
Even so, Judge Weinstein’s recommendation against removal was not 
an idle gesture. DHS could decide to forgo removal proceedings against 
Aguilar as a matter of discretion. More generally, the agency could 
establish an administrative policy of deferring to such recommendations by 
sentencing judges about pursuing removal in particular cases. In recent 
years, DHS has issued numerous memoranda guiding agency officials’ use 
of prosecutorial discretion, setting forth non-exhaustive positive and 
negative factors to consider in individual cases, while also identifying 
specific categories of persons against whom enforcement is presumptively 
inappropriate.53 DHS could designate beneficiaries of NJRADs as another 
factor typically warranting a favorable exercise of discretion for both 
lawfully present and undocumented noncitizens.54 
 
extremely unusual hardship” to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse, 
parent, or child). 
 52  See Matter of Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301, 311 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that a conviction for 
a crime involving moral turpitude bars undocumented noncitizens from seeking cancellation of 
removal if the offense carries a potential sentence of one year or more); Matter of Pedroza, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 312, 316 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that because the underlying conviction was not for a 
crime involving moral turpitude, and the noncitizen had met all the statutory requirements, 
cancellation of removal relief was appropriate).  
 53  See, e.g., Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 1, at 2 (setting agency 
priorities, and the role prosecutorial discretion plays in all other cases); Memorandum from Gary 
Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement et al., to All Field Office 
Dirs., Chief Counsel & Special Agents in Charge, Applicability of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Memoranda to Certain Family Relationships (Oct. 5, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonblade.com/content/files/2012/10/9-Oct-12-PD-and-Family-
Reltionships.pdf (outlining prosecutorial discretion for cases involving same-sex couples and 
families); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, to All 
Employees, on Secretary Napolitano’s Memorandum Concerning the Exercise of Prosecutorial 
Discretion for Certain Removable Individuals Who Entered the United States as a Child (June 15, 
2012), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ 
s1-certain-young-people-morton.pdf (urging officers to exercise prosecutorial discretion in cases 
involving noncitizens who entered the United States as children and meet other characteristics); 
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, to All Field Office 
Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 4–
5 (June 17, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (detailing the relevant factors 
to consider for exercising prosecutorial discretion); Memorandum from William J. Howard, 
Principal Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enforcement, to All Office of the Principal 
Legal Advisor Chief Counsel, Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 24, 2005) (defining prosecutorial 
discretion and providing examples where it would be applicable). 
 54  With respect to the applicability of NJRADs to undocumented persons with criminal 
history, note that before the repeal of the statutory JRAD in 1990, courts were split with respect 
to its effectiveness in a situation involving adjustment of status or other discretionary relief. See 
supra note 11 (citing relevant cases). Importantly, however, the modern statutory scheme uses 
criminal history to trigger not only deportation, but also grounds of inadmissibility and bars to 
lawful return to the United States. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 212, 8 U.S.C. 
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If the agency were to do so, other criminal court judges would likely 
be willing to consider the appropriateness of removal as a component of the 
total package of sentencing sanctions.55 As the Supreme Court recognized 
in Padilla v. Kentucky, in the modern immigration scheme deportation 
comprises an integral part of the penalty facing noncitizens in criminal 
court.56 Accordingly, it is appropriate for criminal court judges to consider 
immigration consequences when assigning or recommending punishment. 
Notably, the issuance of such judicial pronouncements would impose few 
additional costs on the criminal justice system, because judges typically 
canvas the relevant circumstances as part of the underlying sentencing 
decision in any event.57 And if agency enforcement decisionmakers were to 
regularly defer to well-explained judicial advice, they could then channel 
limited resources toward the deportation of far less deserving noncitizen 
lawbreakers. 
B. Pardons, Expungements, and Diversionary Programs 
DHS might make use of other signifying rules of thumb, in addition to 
judicial recommendations against deportation, as it assesses whether to 
deport a noncitizen on the basis of criminal history. These might include 
gubernatorial pardons, judicial expungements, and deferred adjudications 
pursuant to diversionary programs.58 In many circumstances, these moves 
 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(2)(A)(i) (“[A]ny alien convicted of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude . . . is 
inadmissible.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (“Any alien . . . who seeks admission . . . at any time 
in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony [] is inadmissible.”). Accordingly, 
proportionality concerns are present even if a noncitizen with a conviction is also removable 
solely on the basis of unlawful presence. See United States v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557, 558 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (collecting cases establishing that the JRADs were effective in overcoming conviction-
based grounds of exclusion); Cade, supra note 19, at 1809–10 (arguing that proportionality 
concerns are also raised when petty convictions create inadmissibility bars, or foreclose the 
possibility of paths to lawful status or discretionary relief from removal that would otherwise 
have been available); Wishnie, supra note 8, at 428–31 (proposing that bars on reentry must be 
understood as penalties and therefore must comport with proportionality in light of the 
noncitizen’s individual circumstances). In any event, nothing prevents the executive from 
adopting a policy of deferring to NJRADs in cases involving undocumented noncitizens with 
criminal history. 
 55  Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (expressing the Court’s hope that 
defense attorneys and prosecutors will explicitly consider immigration consequences in reaching 
appropriate plea bargains). But see Taylor & Wright, supra note 12, at 1148–49 (noting that 
JRADs were judiciously exercised even when authorized and were virtually unheard of in some 
jurisdictions). 
 56  559 U.S. at 364 (“These [statutory] changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal 
law, deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty 
that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 57  For further discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of administrative reliance on criminal 
court judges’ evaluations of the appropriateness of deportation, see infra Parts II.C. and III. 
 58  See also Cade, supra note 6, at 721–22 (arguing that immigration authorities should adopt 
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to clear the defendant’s record fail to preclude deportation based on 
underlying criminal history.59 This is because Congress defined 
“conviction” for immigration purposes to include any “formal judgment of 
guilt,” or, if there was no adjudication of guilt, any situation in which (1) 
“the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted 
sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt,” and (2) “the judge has ordered 
some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be 
imposed.”60 So long as this broad standard is met, noncitizens remain 
forever convicted for immigration purposes. As a result, many expunged 
convictions and deferred adjudications can still result in deportation. In 
particular, an expungement will preclude deportation only if the conviction 
has been vacated due to a procedural defect. 
A separate provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act results in 
significant limitations on the preclusive effect of pardons for immigration 
purposes.61 In the agency’s interpretation of the statute, which has been 
upheld by the few courts to consider a challenge so far, even full and 
unconditional pardons by a governor or the President will preclude only 
some of the criminal grounds of deportation.62 Pardons are deemed to have 
no effect, for example, on removal of noncitizens for any controlled 
substance offenses.63 
 
these mechanisms as disproportionality rules of thumb). Judicial “Certificates of Rehabilitation” 
are another, lesser-known criminal justice process intended to remove collateral consequences to 
criminal history and thus warrant consideration as a signal that removal should not be pursued. 
See Joy Radice, Administering Justice: Removing Statutory Barriers to Reentry, 83 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 715 (2012) (examining the use of Certificates of Rehabilitation in New York and arguing 
they should be more widely used to relieve barriers to reentry for deserving criminal defendants). 
 59  See Cade, supra note 18, at 373–84 (explaining the statutory provisions and circumstances 
in which pardons, expungements, and deferred adjudications will be ineffective in precluding 
removal); Stacy Caplow, Governors! Seize the Law: A Call to Expand the Use of Pardons to 
Provide Relief from Deportation, 22 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 293 (2013) (arguing that governors 
should extend their use of pardons to ameliorate the harsh effects of deportation); Moore, supra 
note 18, at 679–83; Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 253 (2010) (discussing constitutionality of restrictions on presidential pardons in the 
context of immigration consequences). 
 60  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2012).  
 61  See generally Cade, supra note 18 (discussing the history and current role of pardons in 
immigration law). 
 62  The INA specifically provides that four deportation categories—crimes involving moral 
turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, aggravated felonies, and high-speed flight from an 
immigration checkpoint—will not apply “if the alien subsequent to the criminal conviction has 
been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the 
Governor of any of the several states.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012). The BIA, along with 
the few courts to have considered the issue, have therefore interpreted the current statute to give 
effect to pardons only for the specifically enumerated grounds. See Cade, supra note 18, at 374–
76 (reviewing BIA’s narrow interpretation of the pardon provision); Morison, supra note 59, at 
257–58 (discussing the BIA’s interpretation of § 1227). 
 63  See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Lopez, 2007 WL 2825112 at *1 (B.I.A. Aug. 30, 2007) (finding 
no statutory basis to conclude that a pardon waives a controlled substance ground of 
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As with NJRADs, noncitizens whose convictions have been pardoned, 
vacated, or otherwise set aside frequently will have had their individual 
positive and negative circumstances evaluated by criminal justice 
authorities.64 In fact, pardons and expungements are even more powerful 
expressions than NJRADs of the criminal justice system’s assessment that 
the noncitizen’s criminal history would not warrant removal from the 
United States. A noncitizen who receives an NJRAD remains subject to 
incarceration and potentially a panoply of state-imposed collateral 
consequences. When states fully pardon or expunge a noncitizen’s 
convictions, however, that person cannot be directly punished any further, 
and will no longer face most collateral consequences such as formal 
restrictions on employment, licenses, voting, receipt of benefits, et cetera.65 
Such events thus could function as valuable signals to immigration 
officials that deporting a noncitizen on the basis of the predicate criminal 
history likely would be unfair or disproportional. In fact, deferring to the 
judgment of criminal justice actors in such cases would produce many 
benefits. I turn now to a closer study of the advantages of this reform. 
C. Benefits 
Much would be gained by injecting disproportionality-signaling rules 
of thumb into the processing of deportation cases sounded on past 
criminality. Three important benefits stand out. 
First, relying on disproportionality rules of thumb would prove cost-
neutral for screening out noncitizens whose removal should not be pursued 
in the interest of justice. This innovation would cost the agency virtually 
nothing and would add little to front-line officials’ workloads. The actual 
evaluation and normative balancing in the noncitizen’s case would in effect 
be delegated to law enforcement actors outside the immigration system.66 
 
removability). 
 64  To be sure, in some instances the operation of expungement laws or similar processes 
turns on statutorily defined factors rather than case-by-case discretion. But even in such cases 
there was a legislative evaluation that persons who meet specific criteria deserve relief from a 
conviction, and in many cases the prosecutor acts as an additional gatekeeper for the defendant’s 
access to ameliorating programs. 
 65  See generally Cade, supra note 18, at 394–95, 398 (discussing how criminal convictions 
take away an individual’s societal membership and how pardons can restore it); Margaret Colgate 
Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1204–08 (2010) 
(arguing that presidential pardoning power should be more frequently utilized to overcome the 
collateral consequences of convictions that “operate as continuing punishment”).  
 66  This kind of delegation already occurs in the modern deportation scheme, as police and 
prosecutors make the arrest, charging, and plea negotiation decisions that effectively determine 
immigration consequences. See Lee, supra note 20, at 553 (arguing that police and criminal 
prosecutors have significant influence on the operation of immigration law); Hiroshi Motomura, 
The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the 
Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1826–27 (2011) (arguing that arrest discretion has 
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Specifically, criminal court judges, and, in the case of pardons, governors 
(or in some states, pardon boards) would do the actual work of considering 
whether the noncitizen’s conviction should be stripped of its continuing 
punitive and collateral consequences. Of particular importance, unlike in 
immigration proceedings, all noncitizens facing significant criminal 
charges will have the right to appointed counsel, an important procedural 
measure for helping ensure the equities are aired before the 
decisionmaker.67 In addition, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Padilla, 
defense attorneys must be attuned to the immigration consequences of a 
potential conviction.68 As a result, defense attorneys will be in a good 
position to seek judicial recommendations against deportation during 
sentencing, or deferred adjudication of the conviction when a diversionary 
program is available. Indeed, when statutory JRADs were in place, some 
courts found the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
to encompass JRAD requests.69 Moreover, government attorneys generally 
will have motivation to challenge key claims for mitigation made on behalf 
of the defendant. In sum, the actions of judicial actors and other authorities 
with regard to expungements, diversion, pardons, and sentencing typically 
can be relied on as sound, precisely because they typically (though not 
always) are the products of the adversary system. 
Second, the use of disproportionality rules of thumb would better align 
federal and state priorities. Pardons, expungements, and diversion programs 
reflect and implement the criminal system’s justice-seeking, restorative, 
and expressive goals. The function of such processes is to eliminate, both 
directly and symbolically, the stigma and barriers to integration and 
participation that result from a conviction.70 Seeking to deport the un-
convicted (or never-convicted) creates a tension between federal 
immigration priorities and the state’s criminal justice and membership 
goals. Post-conviction processes like pardons and expungements restore or 
 
an outsized influence on immigration priorities); see also infra note 93 and accompanying text 
(same). 
 67  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants 
have a constitutional right to counsel in felony prosecutions); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25, 37 (1972) (extending the right to counsel to misdemeanor prosecutions). But see Scott v. 
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that states are not constitutionally required to 
appoint counsel where there is no possibility of incarceration). 
 68  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010). 
 69  Id. at 363 (citing Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986) and United States 
v. Castro, 26 F.3d 557 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 70  See Love, supra note 65, at 1204–08 (explaining how pardons remove collateral 
consequences and other barriers to reintegration following a conviction); Jeremy Travis, Invisible 
Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 19 (Marc Mauer & Leda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) 
(arguing that the stigma attached to a criminal conviction demotes the individual’s status in 
society). 
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preserve the membership status that the state previously took away through 
the criminal system. Thus, it is difficult to argue that noncitizens whose 
convictions have been removed (or never even entered) through these 
processes are out-of-step with the community’s social mores. Rather, in 
such cases, the very criminal justice system that produced the predicate 
criminal history in the first place has formally determined that the 
countervailing factors—rehabilitation, remorse, hardship, health, et 
cetera—warrant formally withdrawing (or avoiding) the consequences of a 
conviction. Studies suggest declines in recidivism following these kinds of 
processes, further underscoring their importance as a tool of criminal 
justice.71 Judge Weinstein likewise supported his recommendation against 
deportation in Aguilar with findings about the consequences of removal for 
the defendant’s family, specifically discussing the children’s elevated 
likelihood of criminality due to increased poverty and psychological harm 
resulting from Aguilar’s deportation. By adopting a policy that defers to 
state (or federal) judgments in this respect, federal immigration authorities 
will reduce conflicts with the criminal justice system’s goals. 
Third, and most importantly, disproportionality rules of thumb allow 
the administration to take an important step towards implementing its 
responsibility to take account of individual circumstances in deportation 
cases involving persons with criminal history. A sentencing judge’s 
recommendation against deportation offers the administration a powerful 
tool to avert unjust removals, precisely because such a recommendation is 
tailored to the particular would-be deportee.72 And, as already discussed, 
the other criminal justice mechanisms discussed here may even be stronger 
signals that deportation is inappropriate. Notably, if federal agency officials 
begin to look with greater favor on expungements, diversions, and pardons, 
the consideration of such relief for noncitizens may well gain a new and 
welcome momentum. An agency-wide policy formally recognizing the 
value of disproportionality rules of thumb would help advance consistency 
(though probably not achieve uniformity) across jurisdictions, an outcome 
that may well be preferable to simply encouraging more use of the 
individual discretionary judgments of front-line agents.73 The ultimate 
result of implementing this policy should be fewer unjustified removals of 
 
 71  See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PRISONER REENTRY 168–70 (2005) (citing a number of studies). 
 72  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 361–63 (discussing history and potential impact of JRADs). 
 73  See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 20, at 184–95 (arguing that President Obama’s more 
categorical relief initiatives centralize and make more consistent the agency’s exercise of 
discretion); Kalhan, supra note 29, at 88–90 (discussing the Obama administration’s difficulties 
in guiding individual immigration officers’ use of prosecutorial discretion); Hiroshi Motomura, 
The President’s Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the Rule of Law in Immigration 
Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J (forthcoming 2015) (same).  
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noncitizens with criminal history. 
III 
OBJECTIONS 
What objections to an executive branch policy to rely on 
disproportionality rules of thumb might a skeptic raise? Most critical is the 
question whether such a policy would exceed presidential authority. This 
inquiry raises two sub-questions. First, would the President violate his 
constitutional duty to “Take Care that the laws be faithfully executed” by 
declining to pursue the removal of persons whom Congress has made 
deportable on the basis of criminal history, regardless of extenuating 
circumstances?74 Second, if DHS were to create an administrative policy of 
deferring to NJRADs, despite Congress’s repeal of the preexisting JRAD 
statutory provision, would the executive be engaged in the making of law, 
in violation of the constitutional separation of powers? 
The key to both questions lies in understanding the scope of 
delegation of authority to the executive in the field of immigration law. 
Through both explicit and implicit delegations, the President enjoys a 
sweeping policymaking role in the regulation of noncitizens.75 Statutory 
provisions expressly delegate authority to the executive to manage the 
quantity and origin of foreign nationals fleeing persecution, upheaval, or 
natural disasters.76 A related statutory “parole” authority gives the 
executive power to admit foreign nationals in other humanitarian 
situations.77 With respect to domestic enforcement, Congress has explicitly 
delegated authority to DHS to establish enforcement policies and priorities 
in its administration of immigration law.78 
 
 74  See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (evaluating agency prosecutorial 
discretion not to enforce the law in some cases in light of the President’s constitutional duty to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”); U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. 
 75  Presidents have also claimed inherent authority to regulate immigration policy as an aspect 
of Article II foreign affairs powers. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 191–92 (7th ed. 2012) (reviewing case law on inherent 
presidential power in immigration matters); Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 465–66 
(reviewing history of inherent power doctrine). 
 76  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (2012) (delegating the Attorney General authority to 
designate countries in which natural disasters, war, or other significant upheaval warrant granting 
“temporary protected status” to nationals of those countries who are residing in the United 
States); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 102–03 (1980) (giving the 
President authority to determine the countries from which refugees would be admitted and the 
total number of refugee admissions each year).  
 77  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012) (delegating authority to the Attorney General to 
“parole” inadmissible noncitizens into the country for “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant 
public benefit”). 
 78  See 6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (2012) (charging the Secretary of Homeland Security with 
“[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities”); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) 
(2012) (conferring broad power to the Secretary of Homeland Security over “the administration 
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Additionally, substantial space for executive branch policy-making 
derives from the modern immigration law scheme. Congress’s budgetary 
appropriations provide the immigration agencies with funding that is 
grossly insufficient to the task of removing all deportable noncitizens in the 
United States. The Obama administration has frequently noted that it has 
the resources only to remove about 400,000 persons each year, a number 
that must be divided between interior and border removals. Yet something 
on the order of 11 million unauthorized noncitizens live in the United 
States.79 In addition, many hundreds of thousands of noncitizens who 
lawfully reside in this country are potentially deportable on the basis of 
criminal convictions.80 The practical reality of massive underfunding leaves 
the executive no choice but to set priorities in choosing which tiny fraction 
of the removable population to target for enforcement—as Congress well 
knows.81 
Furthermore, the INA’s sweeping removal grounds, in combination 
with the curtailment of adjudicative discretion or accessible avenues for 
legalization, suggest that Congress meant to delegate primary discretion to 
the executive’s enforcement officials to evaluate the appropriateness of 
individual removals, especially noncitizens caught up in the criminal 
justice system.82 Modern immigration law thus tracks modern criminal law, 
in which legislatures create exceedingly broad penal codes, while limiting 
judicial sentencing options, thereby transferring considerable discretionary 
power to prosecutorial agencies to determine the code’s real-world 
effects.83 As Adam Cox and Cristina Rodríguez have explained, part of the 
executive’s policymaking power stems from “a profound mismatch 
between the law on the books and reality on the ground, which has resulted 
from a series of legal, political, and demographic developments that have 
 
and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization 
of aliens”). 
 79  See Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S., 2012, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 2014), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants-2012/. 
 80  See Cade, supra note 6, at 664 (citing sources). 
 81  Moreover, as Professor Kalhan and many others have noted, the Obama administration 
“not only has enforced the immigration laws to the maximum extent of these appropriated funds, 
but has removed more individuals than any other administration in U.S. history.” Kalhan, supra 
note 29, at 74. 
 82  Cade, supra note 6; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 35; Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 20; 
see also Elizabeth Keyes, Deferred Action: Considering What is Lost, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 
(forthcoming 2015) (discussing the importance of “residual discretion” in immigration law as a 
“tool of leniency” in situations where strict enforcement would lead to an inequitable result). 
 83  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 35, at 517–19 (arguing that the categorical nature of the 
immigration code reallocates discretion from immigration judges to the enforcement officials who 
make charging decisions). See generally Stith, supra note 21, at 1428–34 (examining shifts in 
discretionary power between prosecutors and judges); Stuntz, supra note 21, at 565 (same). 
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accelerated over the last four decades.”84 These developments include not 
only the INA’s blunderbuss removal provisions, but also the longstanding 
acquiescence by both political branches in the unauthorized migration and 
employment of noncitizens.85 
In such an environment, even if the balance between agency resources 
and potential enforcement targets were not so lopsided, there would be 
good reason to believe the executive retains authority to “exercise[] its own 
value judgments about the scope of our immigration policy.”86 This 
prerogative—indeed, this inescapable responsibility—surely encompasses 
prosecutorial efforts to ensure that immigration laws are not enforced in an 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or disproportionate manner.87 The Supreme Court 
has come a long way toward recognizing this point. Thus, in Arizona v. 
United States the Court deemed prosecutorial judgment in determining 
enforcement priorities to be so paramount that it insulated the federal 
government’s discretion to choose among potential deportation targets 
from almost any interference by state law enforcement officials.88 
To be sure, Congress has signaled the importance of apprehending and 
removing noncitizens with criminal histories.89 Even so, nowhere has 
 
 84  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 20, at 131.  
 85  Id. at 49–50 (outlining how Congressional “choices over time . . . have created a parallel 
executive screening regime through which the executive exercises its own value judgments about 
the scope of our immigration policy”); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 
19–55 (2014) (explaining the political and historical factors that contributed to the size of the 
current unauthorized population and the connection with enforcement discretion). 
 86  Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 20, at 22.  
 87  I have developed this argument across a series of articles. See Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, supra note 6, at 668–69 (arguing that the executive branch must endeavor to 
avoid unfair deportations even in cases involving noncitizens with criminal history); Cade, 
Policing the Immigration Police, supra note 37, at 203 (arguing that the executive branch bears 
responsibility for ensuring that the Fourth Amendment is fully upheld in the administration of 
immigration law whether or not judicially enforceable remedies are available); Cade, The 
Challenge of Seeing Justice Done, supra note 27, at 61–62 (suggesting a range of administrative 
reforms to make deportation hearings more accurate and fair). See generally Cade, The Plea 
Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, supra note 19 (arguing that the executive 
should scale back measures targeting noncitizens facing only misdemeanors in light of (1) such 
convictions’ general unreliability as evidence of wrong-doing and (2) corrosive feedback loops 
created by the federal immigration agency’s integration in the misdemeanor system).  
 88  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012) (upholding preliminary 
injunction against three of four provisions of state law providing for local police participation in 
enforcement of federal immigration law on grounds that such actions might unduly burden or 
interfere with the executive’s federal deportation priorities). See generally Cade, Enforcing 
Immigration Equity, supra note 6; Adam B. Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of 
Immigration Law, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 54 (discussing the implications of the ruling in Arizona 
v. United States). 
 89  See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5, 251 
(containing proviso that DHS should prioritize removal of noncitizens in accordance with severity 
of their crimes); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3659 (same); Confirmation Hearing on the 
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Congress ever mandated or even suggested that the executive must deport 
all persons who are removable on criminal grounds (or all members of any 
particular subgroup of deportable noncitizens). Moreover, to the extent 
there are clues in Congress’s appropriations acts, they support recognition 
of broad executive branch discretion by acknowledging—in fact, 
providing—that DHS must prioritize among noncitizens convicted of a 
crime.90 
For these reasons, an administrative policy of relying on 
disproportionality rules of thumb to help sort among deportable noncitizens 
would not amount to an abdication of statutory responsibilities, or 
otherwise run afoul of the executive’s duty to enforce Congress’s laws. 
Rather, such a policy would comport with legislative decisions that clearly 
envision executive branch attempts to rationalize immigration enforcement 
in the modern system. 
Nor does the fact that Congress specifically repealed statutory JRADs 
transform administrative reliance on judicial recommendations such as the 
one Judge Weinstein issued in Aguilar, into an unconstitutional executive 
exercise of lawmaking power. Again, the President’s vast discretionary 
space in the enforcement of immigration law makes it both appropriate and 
necessary for the agency to establish rational means of sorting through a 
massive number of potentially deportable noncitizens. Moreover, there is a 
crucial difference between the operation of the former statutorily-
authorized JRADs and the administrative reliance policy recommended 
here. The statutory JRAD program in effect empowered state or federal 
judges to tie the executive branch’s hands with respect to individual 
deportations. If federal officials wanted to deport a noncitizen on the basis 
of a conviction, they could not do so where a JRAD had been issued. In 
contrast, an administrative decision to defer to a judge’s recommendation 
against removal simply treats that sentencing order as persuasive authority 
regarding the equities in a particular case. A rule of thumb is only a rule of 
thumb. Thus, in applying such a rule, immigration officials would retain a 
large measure of freedom. In certain cases, for example, the agency might 
take a different view of the seriousness of the underlying crime than the 
recommendation-issuing judge. In other cases, executive officials might 
 
Nomination of Loretta Lynch as Attorney General of the United States Before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (written statement of Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Professor, Washington University School of Law) (stating that many of the Congress’s 
appropriations acts “mandate a specific priority on the removal of criminal offenders and, within 
that group of individuals, sub-priorities that depend on the severity of the crime.”). 
 90  See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, 128 Stat. at 251 (providing in part that 
“the Secretary of Homeland Security shall prioritize the identification and removal of aliens 
convicted of a crime by the severity of that crime”); Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, 
and Continuing Appropriations Act 2009, 122 Stat. at 3659 (same). 
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possess other relevant information about the noncitizen’s dangerousness or 
undesirability. Reliance on NJRADs thus would not amount to 
administrative reinstallation of a law that Congress has repealed. 
The preceding discussion shows that disproportionality rules of thumb 
present no constitutional problems. But the executive’s reliance on such 
rules might nonetheless be objectionable on policy grounds. For instance, 
one might claim that rules of thumb are not always accurate. Perhaps some 
pardons will be granted to persons who do not deserve to be pardoned. 
Perhaps not all judges who vacate a conviction or issue a recommendation 
against deportation will have assessed the positive and negative factors in a 
noncitizen defendant’s case in as comprehensive a manner as an 
immigration judge would have in the era before Congress limited their 
authority. Indeed, it is likely that many state judges, with heavy dockets to 
manage, will have less time to issue carefully nuanced rationales explaining 
the basis for an NJRAD in every case. With these possible outcomes, how 
can immigration authorities be sure that actors in the criminal justice 
system are only employing such mechanisms when appropriate? 
This objection, while not frivolous, must be considered in view of the 
fact that the underlying criminal history triggering deportation is itself only 
a proxy for undesirability. By and large the immigration system does not 
endeavor to make a factual determination about a noncitizen’s 
dangerousness, likelihood to transgress society’s norms, or even economic 
productivity.91 Rather, the immigration system relies on convictions, 
generated by law enforcement actors outside the immigration system, as a 
second-order signal about those first-order concerns. Thus, the immigration 
system delegates to state authorities—police, prosecutors, and judges—a 
critical role with respect to the implementation of deportation policy. These 
non-federal actors make the arrest, charging, plea-bargaining, and 
sentencing decisions that effectively determine whether lawfully present 
and undocumented noncitizens alike will be prioritized for deportation, 
detained for that purpose, and perhaps subject to lengthy or permanent bars 
to lawful return. And the immigration system relies on this delegation 
despite the fact that convictions are often unreliable indicators of 
dangerousness, social disconnection, or even wrongdoing, especially in 
 
 91  There some exceptions to this general rule. For example, immigration judges do make 
determinations with respect to allegations of fraudulent activity in seeking immigration benefits. 
See INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i) (“Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, 
seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or 
admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”). Other 
examples include administrative determinations of drug abuse, human trafficking, or terrorist 
activities. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (providing for deportation of “drug abuser[s]”); 
id. § 1227(a)(2)(F) (incorporating 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)) (human traffickers); id. §§ 
1227(a)(4)(A)–(B) (persons convicted of espionage or terrorism).  
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cases involving minor offenses.92 
Seen in that light, the subsequent tempering (or, even more so, the 
repudiation) of the underlying conviction that that very criminal justice 
system imposed in the first place has a telling significance. It signals that 
deportation might well be disproportionate. It merits reemphasis that the 
criminal history proxy for dangerousness and antisocial character is itself 
only a proxy. So when that criminal history is mitigated or negated, the 
proxy greatly weakens, and in many cases disappears. In the end, what is 
good for the goose should be good for the gander. And precisely because 
the criminal history proxy operates as a surrogate, the reworking of that 
history should serve as a marker, too. Again, the undoing of that history 
should not necessarily remove administrative power to proceed with 
deportation. But it should at least raise the presumption of nondeportability 
because, in such circumstances, the logic of the proxy for deportability is 
depleted of its force. Moreover, DHS could issue guidelines governing the 
appropriate timing and content of NJRADs in particular, ignoring or 
discounting those that are less thorough or too tardy. In any event, to the 
extent that NJRADs, expungements, and pardons influence downstream 
immigration consequences, they likely would do so more transparently than 
already occurs through the charging and plea-bargaining decisions of other 
criminal justice actors.93 
A related concern focuses on inconsistency. The worry stems from the 
fact that it is easier to obtain pardons, judicial expungements, or similar 
relief in some states than in others.94 Some criminal sentencing judges will 
 
 92  See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012) (arguing 
that misdemeanor systems are overburdened and insufficiently attuned to questions of 
culpability); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the 
Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 306–09 (2011) (describing the “serious 
institutional pressure from all quarters to quickly ‘dispose of’ misdemeanor cases, often before 
defense counsel can undertake any investigation or adequately review any discovery material”). 
 93  Cf. Lee, supra note 20, at 598–99 (suggesting that transparency would be furthered by re-
creation of JRADs). Furthermore, the professional role of judges facilitates more neutral and 
balanced assessments of noncitizen-defendants’ equities than might occur in the hands of other 
players. Similarly, the political accountability of governors may operate to restrain less-than-
thoughtful pardons. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and 
the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1349 (2008) (“No governor or President wants to 
be viewed as soft on crime or to be blamed if a pardoned individual goes on to commit another 
crime.”); Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 
219, 223–24 (2003) (attributing decline in grants of clemencies to political fears by governors).  
 94  See Margaret Colgate Love, Chart # 3 - Characteristics of Pardon Authorities, NACDL 
RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT (April 2015), 
https://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/2012_restoration_project/Characteristi
cs_of_Pardon_Authorities.pdf; Margaret Colgate Love, Chart # 4 - Judicial Expungement, 
Sealing, and Set-Aside, NACDL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS RESOURCE PROJECT (June 2015), 
http://www.nacdl.org/uploadedFiles/files/resource_center/ 
2012_restoration_project/Judicial_Expungement_Sealing_and_Set-Aside.pdf. Likewise, even 
within the same jurisdiction the availability of certain criminal justice processes will vary 
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be willing to make a determination about whether removal is an appropriate 
part of the defendant’s sanction; others will not. To evaluate this objection, 
one must first recognize that inconsistency is already rampant in the 
criminal deportation system. Criminal offenses and punishments vary 
significantly across jurisdictions, leading to inconsistent immigration 
consequences.95 A particular theft or drug offense in one state might be 
classified as an aggravated felony, triggering deportation without 
discretionary relief and a permanent bar to lawful reentry, but the same 
offense may not be an aggravated felony in another.96 The same is true of 
criminal offenses that might trigger removal as a CIMT or controlled 
substance offense.97 Moreover, even defendants engaging in similar 
conduct within the same jurisdiction can end up with different convictions 
through the mechanics of the plea-bargain process, leading to disparate 
immigration consequences.98 In many cases, such differences across or 
within jurisdictions will have little or nothing to do with the noncitizen’s 
stake in the United States, the gravity of his offense, or other factors 
relevant to the appropriateness of deportation. 
Against this backdrop, a disproportionality-based red flag in some 
cases might operate to reduce problems of unequal treatment of persons 
 
depending on the statutory code or the attitudes of the prosecutor or judge. 
 95  See, e.g., Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting 
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1735 (2011) (“Under a 
categorical analysis, two people who commit the same offense but are able to secure different 
plea deals or are prosecuted in jurisdictions that define the offense differently will face different 
immigration consequences.”); Lee, supra note 20, at 565 (explaining how state prosecutors can 
influence downstream immigration consequences through charging and bargaining decisions). 
 96  See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: A GUIDE 
TO REPRESENTING FOREIGN-BORN DEFENDANTS 461–62 (4th ed. 2009) (noting different 
approaches among jurisdictions to the same offense).  
 97  See id. at 204–06, 210, 300–03, 312–13 (reviewing case law concerning specific offenses). 
Furthermore, with respect to the consequence of pardons in particular, the current deportation 
system tolerates a particularly high level of inconsistency and arbitrariness. For example, the 
agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions allows the effectiveness of the same pardon for 
the same conviction to turn on front-line agents’ charging decisions. See Matter of Suh, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 626 (B.I.A. 2003) (holding that a noncitizen’s full pardon for sexual battery conviction 
eliminated the aggravated felony basis for removal, but had no effect on the domestic violence 
deportability ground also charged by the Government). 
 98  See Cade, supra note 19, at 1772–74 (describing how the “range of charge, fact, and 
sentence bargaining options available under criminal law allows prosecutors and defense counsel 
wide room to structure pleas” in ways that avoid immigration consequences). Note that it is 
possible that administrative reliance on the NJRAD will increase the (less transparent) power of 
prosecutors in the plea bargain phase of criminal proceedings. For example, a prosecutor might 
offer a deal in which the defendant must plea to a deportable offense in exchange for the 
prosecutor’s support when the noncitizen seeks an NJRAD in the sentencing phase. I am grateful 
to Professor Kevin Lapp for this observation, which warrants consideration. For now, my 
response is that criminal prosecutors already enjoy significant leverage in the plea bargaining 
process, and there is no reason to believe that the addition of NJRADs to the mix will 
significantly affect that power one way or the other. 
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caught up in the criminal justice systems of different jurisdictions. 
Moreover, it makes little sense to condemn on unequal-treatment grounds a 
rule of thumb that is designed to ensure that differently-situated persons are 
not arbitrarily and indiscriminately treated exactly the same. In any event, 
there is no escaping the fact that we live in a world of second-best solutions 
to overinclusive deportation grounds. In such a world, enforcement 
officials should take relevant mitigation information where they can find it. 
Finally, some commentators might argue that the rise of 
administrative reliance on disproportionality rules of thumb would 
discourage more lasting reform measures. If NJRADs, pardons, or 
expungements become the operative means of forestalling deportation in 
individual cases, perhaps this reform would stall legislative restoration of 
adjudicative equity or a rollback of the now-overreaching criminal 
deportation grounds. Any such criticism is overly speculative. This is 
especially true because recent history suggests that Congress is not likely to 
enact reforms along these lines in the near future, regardless of the 
circumstances.99 Immigration legislation of any sort is notoriously difficult 
to pass, and the bills that have advanced (but ultimately failed) in recent 
years have not contained measures significantly softening the criminal 
history grounds or returning discretionary authority to immigration 
judges.100 In any event, given the political salience of immigration law, the 
adoption of a new administrative policy in this area is just as likely to 
motivate Congress to review (and perhaps ratify) such a reform as to breed 
a blind legislative passivity.101 
CONCLUSION 
In the modern deportation system, almost any level of criminal 
conviction can trigger deportation and other immigration consequences. At 
the same time, Congress has drastically restricted the discretionary 
authority of back-end adjudicators in immigration courts to avert 
 
 99  See generally MARC R. ROSENBLUM, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY SINCE 9/11: 
UNDERSTANDING THE STALEMATE OVER COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM (2011) 
(analyzing the political obstacles that stand in the way of immigration reform); Ryan Lizza, 
Getting to Maybe: Inside the Gang of Eight’s Immigration Deal, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/06/24/getting-to-maybe (same); Why Immigration 
Reform Died in Congress, NBC NEWS (July 1, 2014, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/why-immigration-reform-died-congress-n145276 
(summarizing failed immigration bills from 2005 to 2014). 
 100  See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 
744, 113th Cong. (as passed by Senate, June 27, 2013); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act 
of 2011, S. 1258, 112th Cong. (2011); Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1639, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
 101  See, e.g., Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 502–06 (discussing instances of 
congressional ratification of executive-generated immigration policies and procedures). 
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disproportionate deportations. The result is a system in which enforcement 
officials wield primary authority to pursue the goals of justice and fairness. 
While the current administration has taken important steps in this respect, it 
has failed to provide for adequate assessment of individual circumstances 
in cases involving persons with criminal histories. As a result, it is all but 
guaranteed that Ignacio Aguilar will soon be deported and barred from 
lawful return to the United States, without any administrative consideration 
of the life-altering impact this outcome will have on his family (particularly 
his children), his positive contributions in this country for more than a 
decade, and other mitigating factors, including the nonviolent and isolated 
nature of the underlying criminal activity. 
Judge Weinstein’s sentencing order in Aguilar points the way toward 
rational administrative reform in such situations. Immigration officials 
could cheaply and efficiently rely on judicial recommendations against 
deportation, pardons, expungements, and similar criminal justice actions as 
stand-ins for the equitable balancing that formerly took place in 
immigration courts. These processes could serve as signals that seeking the 
removal of that noncitizen presumptively would be disproportionate, 
allowing the agency to focus its limited resources on more important 
targets. Until Congress enacts more lasting measures, the executive 
branch’s adoption of a disproportionality-based rule-of-thumb approach 
thus offers an important, if incomplete, step toward creating a more just 
deportation system. 
 
